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Abstract: The effect of foreign capital and trade on the right to physical integrity is 
one of the central issues in human rights scholarship. While there continue to be 
claims for both a negative and a positive association, the empirical evidence 
remains mixed. In this paper, the argument is made that the relationship between 
foreign economic penetration and repression is context-dependent. Countries with 
high levels of human and physical capital and a sound institutional setting tend to 
profit from beneficial spillovers in terms of increasing economic development and 
social equality, which eventually decreases repression levels. In stark contrast, 
foreign investment and trade often gives rise to uneven development in countries 
with low levels of education and institutional quality. In these contexts, foreign 
economic penetration will bring about more repression of security rights. The main 
implications of the argument are tested for a panel of 114 developing countries in 
the period of 1984-2010. The results of the empirical analysis provide considerable 
support for the notion of context-dependence.  
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Introduction1 
Human rights scholarship is divided over the question of the relationship between multinational 
investment, trade and the right to physical integrity. The optimistic view, usually attributed to the 
liberal school, holds that what will from now on be called foreign economic penetration2 (FEP) 
encourages economic growth, and thereby decreases the repression of physical integrity rights. 
Meanwhile, associates of dependency school contend that foreign economic penetration leads to the 
exploitation of Third World countries and thereby lowers state respect for security rights.3 Given the 
rapid pace at which economic globalization proceeds and the central role human rights protection 
occupies both in democratic theory (Beetham 2004; Locke 1970; Saward 1994) and with respect to 
human freedom (Sen 1999), the question of the impact of foreign capital and trade on the right to 
physical integrity has attracted the interest of political scientists, international lawyers, sociologists, 
and economists alike. However, in spite of dozens of studies, the empirical evidence remains mixed. 
While some researchers, both quantitative and qualitative, find that economic flows entail increases in 
the repression of security rights (e.g., Anderson 1999; Evans 1999; London and Williams 1988; Meyer 
1998; Mitchell and McCormick 1988; Monshipouri et al. 2003; Timberlake and Williams 1984), 
others find evidence in support of the more optimistic liberal view (Apodaca 2001; Cingranelli and 
Richards 1999a; Dreher et al. 2012; Hafner-Burton 2005; Meyer 1996; Richards et al. 2001; Spar 
1998, 1999), and still others provide evidence contradicting the arguments of both liberals and 
dependistas (Smith et al. 1999).  
Thus, it seems that based on the evidence at hand, neither the liberal nor the dependency school 
arguments can be fully dismissed (Meyer 1998). Rather, we have to admit that the empirical world is 
more complex than our traditional theories suggest. This leads to the inevitable conclusion that we 
have to start reflecting the empirical complexity in our theories. This article draws on recent work 
(Letnes 2004; Spar 1999) and presents an argument that the effect of foreign capital and trade on state 
respect for security rights is context-dependent. My argument rests on the insight that both traditional 
                                                     
1 I wish to thank Hanspeter Kriesi, Marco Steenbergen, Marc Bühlmann, Isabelle Stadelmann-Steffen, Jonathan 
Wheatley, Fernando Mendez, and Kassandra Birchler, who all provided valuable comments at different stages 
of this study. The remaining errors are, of course, my own. 
2 The term foreign economic penetration is borrowed from Richards et al. (2001). 
3 Throughout this article, the terms ‚physical integrity rights‘ and ‘security rights’ are used interchangeably. 
3 
 
views share one assumption: both introduce the same intervening variables within the causal chain 
running from foreign economic penetration to repression levels. More specifically, both schools agree 
that it is the degree to which multinational investment and trade generate economic development and 
social (in-)equality which sets in motion a set of political and social processes that eventually 
influence national human rights policies. If we accept this basic presumption, we should come to a 
better understanding of the economic globalization-repression nexus providing we inquire about the 
factors that condition the effect of foreign economic penetration on development and equality.  
In line with this logic, it is argued that the ability of a country to absorb potential beneficial 
spillovers is an important mediator of the foreign economic penetration-repression nexus. This ability 
depends foremost on the levels of human capital and institutional quality: on the one hand, in countries 
with high levels of human capital and sound institutions, foreign capital and trade tend to bring about 
beneficial linkages to the local economy as well as technological and organizational upgrading – and 
thereby contribute to economic development and social equality. We should thus in turn expect 
foreign economic penetration to bring about a mitigation of political conflict, a strengthening of 
governmental capacity and eventually a decline in repression levels in countries above a certain 
threshold of absorptive capacity. On the other hand, mainly due to the lack of potential for linkages to 
the domestic economy and the inability of local business to compete, foreign economic penetration is 
likely to raise overall unemployment levels in contexts with a badly educated workforce and low 
institutional quality. Meanwhile, a small domestic elite is likely to profit substantially by way of 
increasing tax revenue and corruption.  In a low absorptive capacity environment, we can therefore 
expect the growing number of poor to insurrect against the increasingly uneven distribution of income 
and the elite to employ more repression in order to avoid redistribution. 
The main implications of the argument are tested along with the traditional views, using a global 
sample of a maximum of 114 developing countries over 27 years (1984-2010). In contrast to most 
previous studies, a composite measure of foreign economic penetration is employed instead of single 
indicators, which enables an assessment of its overall effect. Specifically, data on foreign direct 
investment (FDI) and exports is combined in order to capture the various ways foreign economic 
actors can penetrate the economies of developing countries. Moreover, it is made use of three different 
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proxies for absorptive capacity: economic wealth, literacy rate and executive constraints. The results 
of the empirical analysis provide considerable support for the notion of context-dependence while 
weakening the arguments of both liberals and dependistas. 
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. First, the two traditional accounts are 
summarized. Then, the absorptive capacity argument is outlined. The third section discusses the 
research design. Section four presents the results of the empirical analysis, and the last section 
concludes. 
The Two Traditional Accounts 
Having its roots in neoliberal as well as in modernization theory, the liberal school sees multinational 
investment and trade as an ‘engine of development’ that will ultimately lead to better physical 
integrity rights records. Specifically, international flows of capital and goods are argued to promote 
economic growth by bringing in know-how and technology, by increasing the efficiency of domestic 
markets and by the creation of new jobs (Gilpin 1987; Meyer 1996; Richards et al. 2001). Flows of 
capital and goods are therefore expected to enable a bigger part of the population to meet its basic 
needs, such as food, shelter, and health care (McCorquodale and Fairbrother 1999). It is argued, 
moreover, that the rise in national income leads to a broadened tax base, which will enable the political 
elite to improve social services, such as schools and hospitals (Calloway and Harrelson-Stephens 
2004). Economic development, in other words, is held to widen the policy options of the domestic 
political elite, resulting “in a trickle-down effect wherein socio-economic benefits accrue from an 
expanding economy” (Richards et al. 2001: 220).  
Liberals argue that these socio-economic improvements will favor the emergence or the 
enlargement of a middle class – to which they assign an integral role not only with respect to 
democratization and the functioning of a stable democracy, but also with respect to governmental 
human rights records. On the one hand, it is held that the financially more secure and better educated 
middle class members, in stark contrast to the poor, tend to punish extremist groups and reward 
moderate ones (Lipset 1959). The rise of the middle class is thus expected to mitigate political conflict 
and to discourage political violence – which should in turn lower the need for repression. On the other 
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hand, the economically secure middle class is often held to strive for more popular participation and to 
challenge authoritarian regimes (Lerner 1964). With the rise of the middle class, the demand for 
fundamental human rights will thus increase, making repression an unattractive strategy for the 
political elite striving to stay in power.  
In stark contrast to liberal thought, the Marxist-inspired dependency school predicts foreign 
economic penetration to increase the level of repression of the rights to physical integrity. At the heart 
of this negative view of economic globalization lies the division of the world economy in a two-tier 
structure consisting of a dominant core that exploits the less-developed periphery (Galtung 1971; 
Hymer 1979; Wallerstein 1979). Dependency scholars argue that the penetration of the markets of the 
periphery tends to undermine national development, an assumption for which they give at least two 
reasons. First, local producers are often unable to compete with the incoming multinational 
corporations (MNCs) and are hence driven out of business (Apodaca 2001; Moran 1998). Meanwhile, 
the resulting job loss will in most cases not be absorbed by the job opportunities provided by MNCs 
because they mainly employ capital-intensive production techniques. With the demise of local 
business, unemployment rates are expected to rise (Gilpin 1987). And second, the few job 
opportunities MNCs offer in peripheral countries tend to be low-paid manufacturing or mining jobs, 
whereas the specialized and well-paid managerial positions tend to be concentrated in the core’s 
centers. In the words of Stephen Hymer (1979: 396), the global capitalist system leads to “a division 
of labor based on nationality”, which further contributes to the exploitation and impoverishment of the 
masses in the periphery. 
At the same time, it is argued that the small peripheral elite often benefits from the increasing 
economic flows into their country because MNCs use parts of their profits to co-opt the local elite 
(Timberlake and Williams 1984). As it tends to personally profit from the exploitation of the masses, 
the peripheral elite often has a natural interest in upholding a political climate conducive to foreign 
investors (Richards et al. 2001). In combination, then, the impoverishment of the peripheral masses 
and the enrichment of the local elite are expected to raise repression levels: at some point, the poor 
will revolt against global capitalism and the vast inequalities it generates both at the global and the 
domestic level. Confronted with riots and potential rebellions, the domestic elite will frequently 
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choose to suppress the masses in order to uphold the political system from which it personally profits 
(Hymer 1979; Meyer 1996). The uneven development caused by global capitalism, in other words, 
creates incentives for the periphery’s elite to control the poor by the use of repression. 
Towards a more Differentiated Picture 
As outlined in the introduction, the empirical evidence concerning the effect of foreign economic 
penetration on the repression of security rights remains ambiguous. So far, these differing findings 
have been attributed mainly to methodological and technical reasons. Hafner-Burton (2005), for 
instance, shows in a recent paper that the usage of different measures of economic globalization leads 
to rather different conclusions. Serious concerns, moreover, have been raised with regard to current 
human rights statistics (Hafner-Burton and Ron 2009). And there is of course the usual concern about 
sample bias in the case study literature (cf. King et al. 1994), which tends to concentrate on cases 
where the presence of MNCs led to severe human rights violations. However, we are in no position to 
reject any of the two views outright based on the evidence at hand. The continuing dissent cannot be 
dismissed solely by pointing to technical issues. Rather, we must admit that both the dependency and 
the liberal perspective have been weakened to at least some extent (Meyer 1998). Since neither of the 
traditional accounts can by itself explain the economic globalization-repression nexus, we have to 
adjust our theories so that they are better apt to capture the complexity of the empirical world. In the 
remainder of this section, the argument will be presented that the relation between foreign economic 
penetration and the right to physical integrity is context-specific.  
The Argument 
Though leading to contradictory expectations, the liberal and the dependency views share two crucial 
similarities. First, both introduce the same intervening variables within the causal chain running from 
foreign economic penetration to the repression of security rights: economic development and social 
inequality (Letnes 2004). Liberals, on the one hand, basically argue that foreign capital and trade 
promote economic growth and empower a middle class (i.e., decrease inequality), leading to lower 
levels of violent political conflict and to more demand for human rights, and thus eventually to less 
repression. Dependistas, on the other hand, argue that the foreign penetration of the peripheral markets 
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benefits a small domestic elite only (i.e., increases inequality) while it causes economic stagnation or 
even degeneration for the masses, hence creating the need for the peripheral elite to repress the 
redistributive demands of the have-nots. Second, both liberals and adherents of dependency school 
suggest that foreign economic penetration has a uniform and unconditional effect on repression levels 
in developing countries – always positive (dependency) or always negative (liberals). 
However, contrary to both traditional accounts, globalization has had rather heterogeneous 
effects on economic development and inequality levels across different countries (Colen et al. 2009). 
If we accept the basic premise of both schools that it is the degree to which economic flows affect 
development and inequality which sets in motion a set of political and social processes that eventually 
influence national human rights policies, we should be able to come to a better understanding of the 
globalization-repression nexus providing we inquire about the factors that condition the effect of 
foreign economic penetration on economic development and inequality (cf. Letnes 2004 for a similar 
argument). In other words, the same variables that determine whether the integration of a country into 
the world economy benefits long-term economic growth and reduces social inequality should be 
expected to determine whether foreign economic penetration promotes the protection of the right to 
physical integrity, and vice versa.  
Context Matters 
Aiming to unveil the causes of the heterogeneous effects of globalization, the recent economics 
literature has singled out one factor as an especially important determinant of the effect of foreign 
capital and trade on economic performance: a country’s ability to absorb potential spillovers in the 
form of technological and organizational upgrading as well as beneficial linkages to the local economy 
(Borensztein et al. 1998; Dunning and Lundan 2008; Letnes 2004; Li and Liu 2005; Narula and 
Dunning 2000; Xu 2000). This ability, it is argued, depends foremost on a country’s level of created 
assets such as institutions, human capital and infrastructure. Two of the most important assets needed 
to absorb spillovers – institutional quality and human capital will now be adressed. 
Human capital, in addition to being an important prerequisite for economic development by itself 
(Nelson and Phelps 1966), indirectly affects growth levels as well as inequality by providing the basis 
for the utilization of the potential benefits of economic globalization. This is, on the one hand, due to 
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the fact that multinationals entering a country with a sufficiently skilled workforce are far more likely 
to link with the local economy (Nunnenkamp 2004). The chances for foreign investment to promote 
growth are much bigger if linkages are formed between MNCs, local suppliers, and local retailers. 
Domestic firms, on the other hand, need human capital to make use of the advanced technologies 
economic integration brings into the country (Borensztein et al. 1998). Foreign economic actors, i.e., 
MNCs, often possess advanced knowledge, such as technology or management structures, that allow 
them to produce new goods at lower cost. Hence, domestic economies can profit substantially by way 
of technology and knowledge spillovers, whether in the form of an upgrading of skills and technology 
or by an upgrading of the management system (Dunning and Lundan 2008). However, the domestic 
economies will profit only if sufficient human capital is available to apply this knowledge. Thus, the 
ability to learn is a fundamental requirement for a country to absorb beneficial spillovers (Dunning 
and Narula 1997). 
From this, it follows logically that institutional quality is equally important for a country’s 
absorptive capacity. It is the government which is responsible for providing universal access to 
education; and countries with good institutions are generally expected to invest more in public goods, 
such as human capital (Acemoglu et al. 2001; North 1981, Rodrik et al. 2004). There are, however, 
also other arguments for the importance of institutional quality with respect to a country’s ability to 
profit from foreign investment and trade. First, the state needs to provide and maintain a good 
infrastructure along with a transparent and consistent institutional setting that provides effective 
constraints in particular on the executive, protects the rule of law, secures property rights and 
encourages innovation. Second, in order to sustain development and fight inequality, income levels 
have to be held at a reasonable level. A well-designed welfare system is necessary for ensuring that 
those not lucky enough to profit from globalization are adequately compensated. All of this underlines 
the importance of institutional quality for the absorption of the beneficial spillovers foreign investment 
and trade provide. Only a good and democratic institutional environment can guarantee the rule of law, 
adequate levels of redistribution and the provision of sufficient amounts public goods (Dunning and 
Lundan 2008).  
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In sum, a country’s absorptive capacity appears a major mediator of the effect of foreign 
economic penetration on development and inequality. In turn, it should then be expected that a 
country’s absorptive capacity mediates also the impact of foreign economic penetration on repression. 
Two rather different scenarios emerge. On the one hand, in countries above a certain threshold of 
absorptive capacity, multinational investment and trade tend to contribute to economic development 
by technological upgrading and by providing linkages to the local economy. The tax base, moreover, 
broadens, while the good institutions ensure that this money is efficiently used, e.g., for the provision 
of public goods such as education or safety nets. The combination of the increase in job opportunities 
and redistribution will decrease social inequality and eventually contribute to the enlargement of a 
middle class. Following the liberal account, this can be expected to decrease repression levels. The 
rising middle class will mitigate political conflict by punishing extremist groups, while those that 
remain poor will issue less redistributive demands because they either profit from the increase in job 
opportunities themselves or from the increase in welfare benefits. Either reduces the need for the 
political elite to repress the integrity rights of the people. Moreover, the rising number of economically 
more satisfied and better educated middle class members will demand more participation and 
protection of fundamental rights, thus making repression a more costly strategy. And finally, the 
increasing tax revenue will foster governmental capacity and thereby further contribute to a better 
enforcement of human rights standards (Howard-Hassmann 2005). In particular, civil servants and 
soldiers can be paid better, which gives these an incentive to stay in their offices and abide by 
bureaucratic rules, such as fairness and impartiality, as well as more fundamental standards, such as 
human rights. With higher pay, civil servants and the military are no longer reliant upon the informal 
sector or on taking bribes every time they fulfill a citizen’s request. In addition, the increasing 
revenues make possible a better education of the military, the police and other civil servants in how to 
conform to international human rights standards.  
The picture is less optimistic when absorptive capacity is low. Then, foreign investment and trade 
are likely to lead to uneven development. On the one hand, the economic situation of the masses is 
likely to worsen because the capital-intensive production techniques of incoming MNCs in 
combination with the lack of potential for beneficial linkages to the local economy tend to produce 
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higher unemployment levels. Meanwhile, MNCs are effectively forced to allocate the well-paid 
managerial positions in the Western centers, in particular because of the low supply of human capital. 
Because local producers are at the same time driven out of business, the peripheral poor are forced to 
accept the few low-paid jobs the MNCs provide. This gives rise to the nationality-based division of 
labor and to the economic degeneration of the masses emphasized by Hymer (1979). On the other 
hand, alliances between the domestic elite and MNCs can be expected below a certain threshold of 
absorptive capacity. Both have strong incentives to maintain the status quo: the MNCs are able to 
acquire immensely cheap products which they can sell elsewhere, whereas the local elite profits from 
the multinationals’ taxes and/or bribes. This configuration is very likely a vicious circle: because of 
the impoverishment of the masses, the domestic elite becomes increasingly economically detached 
from its own citizenry and dependent on the foreign economic actors. Following the logic of the 
rentier state (Ross 1999, 2001), the elite then has no longer to invest in costly public goods, such as 
education, in order to ensure compliance by its citizens but can rather use a patronage system to 
maintain power – which will further aggravate the problem of low absorptive capacity. Following the 
arguments provided by dependency school, the combination of low absorptive capacity and foreign 
economic penetration is likely to increase repression levels. The elite, willing to maintain a climate 
that is conducive to foreign investment and trade, will answer the inevitable insurrection of the poor 
against the uneven distribution of income by suppression.  
Implications 
The argument that a country’s absorptive capacity conditions the effect of foreign economic 
penetration on the right to physical integrity leads to the following two testable implications: 
1) When absorptive capacity is high, an increase in foreign economic penetration tends to 
decrease the level of repression of the right to physical integrity. 
2) When absorptive capacity is low, an increase in foreign economic penetration tends to lead to 
higher levels of repression of the right to physical integrity. 
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Research Design 
Data and Measures 
Repression of the Right to Physical Integrity. The dependent variable in this investigation is the 
level of repression of the right to physical integrity, which is measured by the CIRI Physical Integrity 
Rights Index (Cingranelli and Richards 2011). Note that the CIRI index assesses government respect 
for the right to physical integrity, i.e., the inverse of repression levels. Thus, a positive coefficient sign 
will indicate less repression, and vice versa. Cingranelli and Richards (1999b: 407) define the right to 
physical integrity as “the entitlements individuals have in international law to be free from arbitrary 
physical harm and coercion by their government”. According to them, the right to physical integrity 
encompasses in particular the right not to be subjected to torture, political imprisonment, extrajudicial 
killing, and disappearance. The CIRI index assesses government respect for all four of these rights, 
employing content analysis of the Amnesty International (AI) annual reports and the U.S. State 
Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. The AI assessment is treated as authoritative 
if the two differ in order to remove potential biases in favor of U.S. allies (Cingranelli and Richards 
2010).4 Respect for all four types of rights is coded on an ordinal scale ranging from 0 to 2, whereby 0 
represents “practiced frequently”, 1 “practiced occasionally”, and 2 “have not occurred”. Coding is 
based on reported numbers where they are available. Specifically, a country receives a score of 2 if 
there are no violations, a score of 1 if there are 1 to 49 violations, and a score of 0 if there are 50 or 
more violations (Cingranelli and Richards 1999b). However, in practice, these numeric thresholds are 
seldom used to produce scores because the reports rarely provide such detailed information. Instead, 
most scores are based on qualitative descriptions. For instance, violations of a particular right that are 
described as ‘widespread’ or ‘systematic’ are coded as 0 (Cingranelli and Richards 2010). The CIRI 
Physical Integrity Rights Index represents the added scores of all four types of physical integrity 
rights; accordingly, it ranges from 0 (no respect for all four rights) to 8 (full respect for all four rights). 
Foreign Economic Penetration. Most previous studies of the foreign economic penetration-
repression nexus employed single indicators as measures of economic globalization, such as net 
                                                     
4 However, Poe et al. (2001) show that there is significant and increasing agreement between the AI and the State 
Department reports. 
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inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI). However, the usage of single indicators is problematic 
when one wants to assess the overall effect. Single indicators of economic globalization capture 
different processes or different actors (Hafner-Burton 2005), which can lead to omitted variable bias 
(Dreher et al. 2012). Thus, a more comprehensive approach is necessary for an investigation into the 
overall effect of foreign economic penetration.  
Two different solutions are proposed in the literature. Richards et al. (2001), on the one hand, 
throw several measures of multinational economic flows into the same regression model. This 
strategy, however, is problematic because the different indicators are often correlated and will thus 
cause multicollinearity. Trade and FDI, two of the most important aspects of economic integration, are 
generally considered complementary in some cases and substitutes in others (Henisz 2000). For 
instance, MNCs may choose to invest in countries where property rights are adequately protected, 
whereas they may opt to substitute at least part of the investment by trade in countries where their 
economic activity faces serious risks. We are thus left with the second strategy: using a composite 
measure. So far, to the best of my knowledge, only one index has been applied in quantitative human 
rights scholarship (Dreher et al. 2012): the KOF Index of Economic Globalization (Dreher 2006; 
Dreher et al. 2008). But the usage of the KOF index in the context of human rights research appears 
problematic as well. First, the index rests in part on data on economic openness, including measures of 
import barriers, tariff rates and capital controls. However, all existing theoretical arguments suggest 
that it is flows of capital and goods – and not economic restrictions – that affect repression levels. 
Because economic openness does not necessarily imply higher levels of foreign investment and trade, 
its inclusion into the measurement is deficient. Second, the KOF Index of Economic Globalization is 
highly correlated to another aspect of globalization, social globalization, which makes it impossible to 
discern their effects on repression levels (cf. Dreher et al. 2012). And third, even the sub-index 
incorporating data on actual economic flows (foreign investment and trade) only is less than optimal 
for the present purpose as it combines data on inward and outward investment as well as imports and 
exports. Neither outward investment nor imports adequately reflect the theoretical mechanisms at 
work; the theoretical focus lies on inflows of capital and their consequences (technology spillovers, 
linkages to local economy vs. economic dependence on foreign actors) rather than on outflows.  
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Thus, a new composite measure of foreign economic penetration is constructed. It aims to capture 
the various ways foreign economic actors and in particular MNCs can penetrate the economy of a 
developing country. The measure includes data on FDI inward stock and flows (UNCTAD 2011) and 
on exports of goods and services (World Bank 2012). The method of constructing the composite score 
leans on the one used for the KOF index proposed in Dreher (2006) and Dreher et al. (2008). In a first  
Table 1: Foreign Economic Penetration 
   Component Weight Source 
   FDI Inward Stock / GDP 44.2% UNCTAD (2011) 
   FDI Inward Flows / GDP 30.4% UNCTAD (2011) 
   Exports / GDP 25.4% World Bank (2012) 
    
step, the data is weighted by Gross Domestic Product (GDP), using data from the UNCTAD. In the 
second step, all three individual variables are transformed in a way that they approach normal 
distribution (using a Box-Cox power transformation) and are then rescaled to a scale of .1 to 10. In the 
subsequent third step, the individual variables are weighted (cf. table 1) and added up to the measure 
of foreign economic penetration. The weights are determined by principal factor analysis. In the last 
step, the measure of foreign economic penetration is rescaled to a scale of .1 to 10. 
Absorptive Capacity. A country’s ability to absorb potential positive spillovers of foreign 
capital and trade is a rather complex, multidimensional concept encompassing in particular human 
capital, infrastructure and institutional quality. To my knowledge, there is no measure available that 
factors in all relevant aspects. A threefold strategy is thus adopted. First, economic wealth is employed 
as a proxy for a country’s absorptive capacity in toto. Economic wealth seems a good surrogate 
because it captures all components of absorptive capacity at the same time. At least on average, 
economically more developed countries tend to have higher levels of human capital and infrastructure 
as well as to be more democratic and less corrupt, i.e., they tend to have better institutional quality. 
Economic wealth is operationalized by logged GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity 
(PPP) in constant 2005 international dollars. The data is culled from the Penn World Tables (Heston et 
al. 2011). 
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Second, literacy rates are used to proxy for one of the most important components of absorptive 
capacity, human capital. The data is retrieved from the World Development Indicators (World Bank 
2012). The average values of each decade are used because literacy rates are only seldom measured on 
an annual basis and in order to address measurement error. Third, the executive constraints measure 
from the Polity IV data set (Marshall and Jaggers 2010) is employed in order to proxy for another vital 
part of absorptive capacity: institutional quality. Arguably, the extent of institutionalized constraints 
on the decision-making of state executives is a vital component of the quality of institutions. 
Controls 
An evaluation of the effect of foreign economic penetration on repression levels requires a reasonable 
baseline model of state terror. In particular, we have to control for those factors that are believed to be 
associated with both economic flows and repression levels. Conflict levels constitute such a factor. 
Governments involved in domestic or external conflicts tend to exert strong control over their citizens 
in order to maintain power and are often willing to use force to defend their authority (Poe and Tate 
1994). On the other hand, political instability might scare off potential foreign investors, thus lowering 
the amount of foreign capital a country receives. Conflict levels are controlled for using data on civil 
and international armed conflict (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Themnér and Wallensteen 2011).  
A second factor often held to affect both repression and economic flows is economic standing. 
High-income countries as well as those having high growth rates tend to attract more investment 
(Asiedu 2002) and to produce more goods that can be exported. Moreover, citizens in wealthier 
countries are also often argued to present little threat to the political elite, thus lowering the need for 
repression. Meanwhile, some argue that rapid short-term economic growth can also increase social 
inequalities and hence be a destabilizing force that will tempt regimes to repress (Henderson 1991; 
Mitchell and McCormick 1988; Pritchard 1989; Poe and Tate 1994; Poe et al. 1999). Annual GDP 
growth rates are employed along with logged GDP per capita (PPP) to control for economic standing 
(World Bank 2012; Heston et al. 2011). Note that GDP per capita serves a double function where 
economic wealth is used as proxy for absorptive capacity: control and mediator of the effect of foreign 
economic penetration on respect for human rights. 
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Another possible confounder, often neglected in previous research, is the level of social 
interconnectedness. The integration of societies via, for example, global communication media or the 
internet is argued to increase government respect for human rights as it puts international pressure on 
governments to comply with human rights standards (Rosenau 2003). Non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), for instance, use global human rights standards in order to pressure national 
governments to improve their human rights protection (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005; Keck and 
Sikkink 1998; Risse et al. 1999). Therefore, governments in countries with tight links to the 
international society have to address human rights issues in order to avoid bad publicity. However, at 
the same time, a country’s degree of social interconnectedness is obviously correlated to other aspects 
of globalization, such as international economic flows. Omitting the social aspect of globalization may 
thus cause the foreign economic penetration variable to take up some of its effects. It is made use of 
the KOF Index of Social Globalization (Dreher 2006; Dreher et al. 2008) to control for the level of 
social interconnectedness. 
In addition, it is controlled for a set of variables that have been repeatedly shown to influence 
repression levels both statistically and substantively significant: demographic factors, democracy, 
regime type, cultural influences, resource dependence, and past practice (cf., e.g., Mitchell and 
McCormick 1988; Poe and Tate 1994; Poe et al. 1999). Compare the appendix for detailed 
operationalizations, data sources and descriptive statistics. 
Models and Methods 
The basic aim of this article is an investigation of the conditional effect of foreign economic 
penetration on repression levels. Time-series cross-section (TSCS) models are useful for this purpose 
because they allow for a simultaneous test of cross-sectional and longitudinal effects. It is made use of 
a global sample of a maximum of 114 developing countries5 that covers a time frame of 27 years 
                                                     
5 The definition of a developing country follows the World Bank. In particular, the sample covers: Albania, 
Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belarus, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, 
Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, 
Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo (DRC), Congo (Rep.), Costa Rica, Cuba, Djibouti, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Guatemala, 
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, 
Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Lithuania, Macedonia, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, 
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(1984-2010). The focus on developing countries is warranted because these are the critical test cases: 
both the sorrows and hopes as regards the foreign economic penetration-repression nexus lie on the 
developing world. The unit of analysis is country-year.  
TSCS analysis is complicated by the fact that standard ordinary least squares (OLS)-
specifications are inadequate due to the usual presence of non-spherical errors and unobserved 
between-unit heterogeneity (Beck 2001; Hsiao 2003). Most existing studies of the foreign economic 
penetration-repression nexus try to overcome these problems by using some variant of the well-known 
Beck and Katz approach (Beck and Katz 1995). That is, they pool all observations, employ OLS or 
some variant, and try to counter autocorrelation, spatial correlation and panel heteroskedasticity by the 
introduction of a lagged dependent variable (LDV) and the calculation of Huber/White or panel-
corrected (PCSEs) standard errors (e.g., Apodaca 2001; Dreher et al. 2012; Meyer 1996; Richards et 
al. 2001). Yet, complete pooling approaches can be a dangerous strategy because they address only 
one problem of TSCS analysis, i.e., the issue of non-spherical errors, and leave unaddressed the 
second fundamental problem: unobserved unit heterogeneity (Green et al. 2001; Wilson and Butler 
2007). More specifically, the pooling of all observations constrains the unobserved unit heterogeneity 
to zero and thereby implies that all countries are completely homogeneous. This is a rather strict 
assumption which, if not satisfied, can lead to biased parameter estimates.6 
Instead of a complete pooling approach, random intercept models will be employed. Random 
intercept – or, more generally, multilevel – models account for unit heterogeneity by the 
decomposition of the error term into a level-1 (time) and a level-2 (country) component.7 The former 
varies from observation to observation in a way similar to an OLS residual, whereas the level-2 error 
component remains constant across units and thus represents unmeasured differences between the 
units (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2008; Raudenbush and Bryk 2002; Snijders and Bosker 1999). 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Peru, Philippines, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, South Africa, 
Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Syria, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, 
Uganda, Ukraine, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. 
 
6 In fact, likelihood-ratio tests suggest that there is significant unobserved heterogeneity at the country level in 
every model in the empirical analysis. 
7 Both the level-1 and the level-2 errors are assumed to be a random draw from a normal distribution. Note that I 
do not employ an explicit correction for the standard errors. This seems justified because threats to their 
accuracy are minimal in multilevel models due to the accounting for cluster-level heterogeneity. 
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Moreover, when compared to the other prominent approach for modeling unit heterogeneity, i.e., 
country fixed effects (FE), an additional attribute of multilevel models make them an attractive choice: 
their ability to deliver optimal estimates of the effects of contextual variables (Beck and Katz 2001; 
Hox 2011; Shor et al. 2007). Conversely, the coefficients in FE models will be inefficient in many 
cases because the lion’s share of the variation of contextual variables is cross-sectional rather than 
longitudinal. This attribute of multilevel models is particularly important for the present purpose 
because we are interested in the question whether the effect of foreign economic penetration on 
repression levels is moderated by absorptive capacity, an inherently sluggish concept.  
Regarding the specification of the model, note that all independent variables are lagged by three 
years. While most existing studies employ shorter lags (or do not lag at all), the three-year lag aims at 
better reflecting the theoretical argument that a series of social and political processes are in-between 
foreign economic penetration and its effect on repression. What is more, the lagging addresses – to at 
least some extent – possible endogeneity concerns (cf. Meyer 1998). Furthermore, and as is standard 
in the human rights literature, a lagged dependent variable is included. Neglecting past practice may 
well lead to biased estimates because government bureaucracies tend to make incremental decisions, 
whereby past decisions are often used as a baseline for present decisions (Wildavsky 1984; Poe et al. 
1999). Thus, continuity in levels of repression should be expected. At the same time, the introduction 
of a lagged dependent serves the purpose of modeling autocorrelation (Keele and Kelly 2006). Lastly, 
a control for time trends in the data is included. There is some evidence that the increasing availability 
of human rights information over time has generally led to longer human rights reports. This is 
problematic because longer reports tend to be rated worse (Poe et al. 2001). Three-year dummies are 
entered in order to capture such potential time trends in the data. In addition, the three-year dummies 
take care of unobserved common exogenous shocks, such as the end of the Cold War or 9/11. This 
leads to the following base model (in matrix notation): 
𝑌𝑡𝑗 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋1𝑡−3𝑗  + 𝛽3𝑋2𝑡−3𝑗 +  𝛽3𝑋1𝑡−3𝑗 ∗ 𝑋2𝑡−3𝑗 +  𝛽4𝑍1𝑡−3𝑗  +  𝛽4𝑍2𝑗  +  𝛽5𝑌𝑡−3𝑗 + 𝑤𝑡 + 𝑢𝑗  +  𝑒𝑡𝑗   
where the subscripts t and j denote the year of observation and the country, Y is the observed level of 
repression, X1 the level of foreign economic penetration, X2 the level of absorptive capacity, Z1 and Z2 
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a vector of all level-1 and level-2 control variables, respectively, β0 the fixed intercept, β1 – βn the fixed 
regression coefficients, wt the time fixed effects, uj the level-2 error term or random intercept, and etj 
the level-1 error term. Note the interaction term that aims to capture the potential conditioning effect 
of absorptive capacity. All models are estimated by maximum likelihood. 
Results 
As explained earlier, the main implications of the argument are tested using three different measures 
of absorptive capacity. Table 2.a and 2.b give the results. Let me focus first on models 1 and 2, where 
economic wealth is used as proxy for absorptive capacity. The former model provides a test of the 
arguments of the liberal and the dependency school arguments that foreign economic penetration has 
an unconditional positive or negative effect on state respect for the right to physical integrity. We can 
see that the level of foreign economic penetration has no direct, unconditional effect on repression 
levels. While the sign is negative, the level of statistical significance is far off from conventional 
levels. This contradicts both traditional accounts. Consider now model 2, which includes an interaction 
between foreign economic penetration and absorptive capacity as measured by economic wealth. Note 
first the results of a likelihood ratio test of model 2 versus model 1, which indicates that the 
introduction of the interaction term improves model fit on the 1%-level of significance. A comparison 
of the information criteria leads to the same conclusion8; and so does the fact that the estimated 
standard deviations of the random effects are smaller in model 2. This indicates that the amount of 
unexplained variance at both level-1 (longitudinal) and level-2 (cross-sectional) decreases with the 
introduction of the interaction term.  
However, an improvement of model fit says nothing about the substantial effect. Because the 
inclusion of an interaction term renders impossible a direct interpretation of coefficient estimates, the 
marginal effect of foreign economic penetration is graphically illustrated (cf. Brambor et al. 2006). 
Figure 1 shows its marginal effect over logged GDP per capita (PPP). We can see that the effect of 
foreign economic penetration does indeed depend on economic wealth: while the marginal effect is 
negative in low income countries, it is positive in high income countries. However, the logarithmized   
                                                     
8 Information criteria such as the AIC and the BIC allow for comparing the appropriateness of different models 
fit on the same data by combining fit and complexity. The model with smaller values for the information 
criterion is considered to be better (Hamaker et al. 2011). 
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Table 2.a: Random Intercept Models of CIRI Physical Integrity Rights Index, 1984-2010  
 
 
Note: the βs are unstandardized coefficients; * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 (two-tailed test); all independent variables 
are lagged by 3 years; all models contain 3-year time dummies (not reported) and are estimated by maximum likelihood. 
 
 
 
 
 Model 1 Econ. Wealth 
Model 2 
Econ. Wealth 
Model 3 
Literacy 
Model 4 
Literacy 
Variables β S.E. β S.E. β S.E. β S.E. 
         
Foreign Economic Penetration -.016*** .026 -.677*** .167 -.021*** .032 -.331*** .08 
Economic Wealth (log) .028*** .079 -.344*** .121 .087*** .099 .091*** .098 
Foreign Economic Penetration X 
Economic Wealth (log) *  .086*** .022     
Literacy     -.002*** .004 -.019*** .006 
Foreign Economic Penetration X  
Literacy       .004*** .001 
Social Globalization .009*** .005 .003*** .006 .008*** .006 .004*** .006 
Democracy (Polity IV) .034*** .008 .036*** .008 .031*** .009 .033*** .009 
Population Size (log) -.474*** .039 -.476*** .038 -.507*** .048 -.51**** .048 
Population Growth .067*** .033 .066*** .033 .063*** .039 .091*** .04 
Economic Growth -.007*** .005 -.008*** .005 -.014*** .006 -.016*** .006 
Civil War (Low Intensity) -.44**** .097 -.464*** .097 -.26**** .107 -.285*** .107 
Civil War (High Intensity) -1.079*** .138 -1.137*** .138 -.887*** .161 -.935*** .16 
International War .015*** .182 .007*** .181 .048*** .191 .068*** .19 
Military Regime -.151*** .101 -.172*** .1 -.281*** .131 -.245*** .13 
Communist Regime .442*** .256 .558*** .254 .579*** .356 .583*** .354 
Fuels Exporter -.34**** .213 -.302*** .209 -.386*** .274 -.349*** .273 
British Colony -.034*** .15 .002*** .148 -.107*** .183 .002*** .184 
French Colony .085*** .161 .122*** .159 .177*** .208 .316*** .209 
Iberian Colony -.139*** .16 -.113*** .157 -.064*** .186 .011*** .186 
Past Practice (Yt-3) .31**** .019 .305*** .019 .292*** .023 .285*** .023 
Intercept 7.174*** .668 10.146*** .996 7.325*** .832 8.481*** .873 
         
Random Effects Std. Dev. S.E. Std. Dev. S.E. Std. Dev. S.E. Std. Dev. S.E. 
         
Level-1 (Time) 1.25**** .048 1.248*** .018 1.162*** .021 1.156*** .021 
Level-2 (Country) .483**** .018 .47****** .047 .558*** .058 .556*** .058 
         
Model Properties         
         
N (Level-1) 2510  2510  1682  1682  
N (Level-2) 114  114  107  107  
Deviance 8406.924  8390.968  5434.944  5417.366  
AIC 8462.924  8448.968  5492.944  5477.366  
BIC 8626.11  8617.981  5650.349  5640.198  
LR Test vs. Additive Model (chi2)   15.96***    17.58***  
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Table 2.b: Random Intercept Models of CIRI Physical Integrity Rights Index, 1984-2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: the βs are unstandardized coefficients; * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 (two-tailed test); all independent variables 
are lagged by 3 years; all models contain 3-year time dummies (not reported) and are estimated by maximum likelihood. 
 Model 5 Ex. Constraints 
Model 6 
Ex. Constraints 
Variables β S.E. β S.E. 
     
Foreign Economic Penetration -.005*** .027 -.118*** .042 
Executive Constraints .08**** .027 -.078*** .052 
Foreign Economic Penetration X 
Executive Constraints   .033*** .009 
Economic Wealth (log) -.005*** .081 .009*** .08 
Social Globalization .011*** .005 .008*** .005 
Democracy (ACLP) .193*** .118 .217*** .118 
Population Size (log) -.47**** .039 -.457*** .039 
Population Growth .079*** .033 .079*** .033 
Economic Growth -.007*** .005 -.008*** .005 
Civil War (Low Intensity) -.431*** .099 -.439*** .098 
Civil War (High Intensity) -1.046*** .141 -1.067*** .141 
International War .01**** .182 .005*** .182 
Military Regime -.086*** .106 -.111*** .106 
Communist Regime .423*** .253 .396*** .251 
Fuels Exporter -.273*** .213 -.235*** .211 
British Colony -.06**** .151 -.041*** .15 
French Colony .068*** .162 .103*** .161 
Iberian Colony -.125*** .159 -.142*** .158 
Past Practice (Yt-3) .309*** .02 .305*** .02 
Intercept 6.904*** .668 7.286*** .673 
     
Random Effects Std. Dev. S.E. Std. Dev. S.E. 
     
Level-1 (Time) 1.247*** .018 1.244*** .018 
Level-2 (Country) .5***** .048 .474*** .048 
     
Model Properties     
     
N (Level-1) 2449  2449  
N (Level-2) 114  114  
Deviance 8188.619  8176.219  
AIC 8246.619  8236.22  
BIC 8414.918  8410.323  
LR Test vs. Additive Model (chi2)   12.4***  
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Figure 1: Marginal Effect of FEP over Economic Wealth   Figure 3: Marginal Effect of FEP over Literacy Rate 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Marginal Effect of FEP over Economic Wealth   Figure 4: Marginal Effect of FEP over Executive Constraints 
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Note: in figure 1, 3, and 4, the solid lines give the marginal effect and the 
dashed lines give the 95% confidence interval. In figure 2, the dots give 
the marginal effect and the bars the 95%-confidence interval. 
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scale is rather unintuitive. See thus figure 2, which presents the same graph, except that the logged 
GDP per capita is re-transformed. It becomes visible that foreign economic penetration has a 
statistically significant (5%-level) negative effect on state respect for the right to physical integrity if 
per capita income is below roughly 1,350 international dollars. Meanwhile, it has a significant positive 
effect if per capita income is higher than about 5,400 international dollars. The number of observations 
falling into these regions of significance is quite considerable. GDP per capita is below 1,350 
international dollars in about 830 of our total of 2,510 country-years (i.e., 33% of the sample) and 
above these 5,400 international dollars in roughly 640 (i.e., 25% of the sample). Importantly, the 
conditional effect is substantially significant as well. Consider the following two examples falling 
roughly in the middle of the regions of significance. Model 2 predicts that a one-unit increase in the 
level of foreign economic penetration decreases government respect for the right to physical integrity 
by about .1 in a country with a per capita income of 800 international dollars while increasing 
government respect by about the same amount in a country with a per capita income of 7,500 
international dollars. The size of these effects equals roughly the effect of a three-unit change on the 
21-point Polity IV-scale. In sum, we find considerable support for the notion of context-dependence.  
Let us now see the results for the two other measures of absorptive capacity.9 Models 3 and 4 
show the results for literacy rate, whereas models 5 and 6 give the estimates for the executive 
constraints measure.10 All in all, the results lend further support to the absorptive capacity thesis. On 
the one hand, foreign economic penetration continues to have no statistically significant unconditional 
effect (cf. models 3 and 5). On the other hand, both the literacy rate and executive constraints seem to 
mediate the effect of multinational investment and trade on the right to physical integrity in the way 
the absorptive capacity thesis suggests (cf. models 4 and 6). Again, model fit increases significantly 
when the interaction terms are included, as suggested by likelihood ratio tests; and again, the models 
including the interaction term leave less variance (both level-1 and level-2) unexplained. Figures 3 and 
                                                     
9 Note that proxying for absorptive capacity by a measure other than GDP per capita allows for a separate control 
of economic wealth. 
10 In models 5 and 6, the democratic regime dummy presented in Alvarez et al. (1996) is used instead of the 
combined Polity IV score as measure of democracy because the measure of executive constraints employed in 
these models is part of the Polity IV scale. The democratic regime dummy seems an adequate surrogate 
because it is essentially a measure of vertical accountability, as opposed to the executive constraints scale, 
which is a measure of horizontal accountability. Thus, the democracy dummy is unlikely to cause 
multicollinearity. 
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4 illustrate the marginal effect over literacy rate and executive constraints, respectively. In line with 
the findings for GDP per capita, the figures indicate that foreign economic penetration has a negative 
effect on government respect for the right to physical integrity when the literacy rate and the 
constraints on the executive are low and a positive effect when the literacy rate or the executive 
constraints are high. Meanwhile, both the size of the effects and the regions of significance are 
comparable to the analysis with economic wealth.11  
Importantly, most of the estimated parameters for the control variables are in accord with 
previous studies. The level of democracy as well as past practice seem strong predictors of 
government respect for the right to physical integrity, while civil conflict and population size are both 
associated with higher levels of repression. Meanwhile, in line with some of past research, external 
conflict seems not a robust predictor of the repression of physical integrity rights (Richards et al. 
2001). When we turn to regime type, we can see that countries with an experience of a military regime 
tend to fare worse with regards to human rights standards, whereas, somewhat unexpected, communist 
regimes tend to have better records. However, Poe et al. (1999) presented a similar finding.  
Deviating from previous empirical work, the level of social integration, cultural influences (i.e., 
colonial experience) and natural resource abundance have no consistent statistically significant effect. 
Especially the latter finding should not come as too big a surprise in light of the ongoing debates both 
on the adequate measurement and the effects of resource abundance (e.g., Brückner 2010; 
Brunnschweiler and Bulte 2008; Collier and Hoeffler 2009; Isham et al. 2005; Herb 2005; Ross 1999, 
2001; Sachs and Warner 1999). Moreover, population growth has a rather robust positive effect on 
state respect for the right to physical integrity, calling for further research on the question of the 
relation between demography and human rights. Perhaps even more surprising, economic 
development has no statistically significant effect on state respect for the right to physical integrity. 
This finding stands in contrast to almost all previous empirical research on the determinants of 
                                                     
11 Model 4 predicts a statistically significant (95%) negative effect of foreign economic penetration so long as 
the literacy rate is below 60% and a significant (95%) positive effect if the literacy rate is 93% or higher, 
representing about 31% and 21% of the sample, respectively. Model 6 predicts a statistically significant (95%) 
negative effect if the 7-point executive constraints scale takes on the lowest value, i.e., 1, and a significant 
(95%) positive effect in case of the two highest values, i.e., 6 and 7. However, the marginal effect at the 
second-lowest value of the constraints measures misses the 95%-level just barely and is significant at the 90%-
level. About 12% (25%) and 32% of the sample fall within these regions of significance.  
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repression (Davenport 2007; for an exception cf. Richards et al. 2001). However, unlike most previous 
research, this study focuses on developing countries, operationalizes economic wealth by per capita 
income adjusted for purchase power parity and employs a three-year lag of all independent variables. 
What is more, following the general argument presented in this article, it is possible to make intuitive 
sense out of this result. Namely, it may well be that economic development can have both a negative 
and a positive effect that overall cancel each other out, depending on whether economic development 
benefits a large share of the population or only a small fraction. In the former case, the bulk of citizens 
may tend to be more satisfied, which could in turn decrease repression levels, whereas in the latter 
case, the increasing inequality may create unrest and stimulate opposition to the ruling elite, thus 
increasing the need to repress the eventual revolts. In fact, the parameter estimates for economic 
growth support this interpretation. While not statistically significant in every model, the sign is 
consistently negative. This provides an indication that short-term economic growth can indeed be a 
destabilizing force because it often increases social inequality.  
Sensitivity Analyses 
Regional Differences. Sub-Sahara African countries are heavily over-represented in the negative 
regions of significance, i.e., the models presented so far predict a negative effect of foreign economic 
penetration in a much bigger part of Sub-Sahara Africa than, e.g., of Latin America. This may raise the 
concern that it is not absorptive capacity that mediates the effect of foreign economic penetration, but 
rather Sub-Sahara Africa-specific cultural or geographic factors that are captured by the different 
measures of absorptive capacity. However, the results remain stable when region dummies are added 
to the regressions (the results can be obtained upon request). Moreover, the results are robust to 
dropping all Sub-Sahara African countries. The first two columns in table A3.a, A3.b, and A3.c show 
that foreign economic penetration continues to have no direct effect on repression when excluding 
Sub-Sahara African countries, as well as that absorptive capacity continues to mediate the effect in 
accordance to the theoretical argument, irrespective of whether it is measured by economic wealth, 
literacy rate or executive constraints. The fact that the estimates are not driven by regional differences 
reassures our confidence in the results. 
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Country Fixed Effects. A major complaint lodged against the random effects models employed 
in this paper relates to the restrictive assumption that the random intercepts are uncorrelated with the 
explanatory variables (Goldstein 2011). The critics contend that this assumption is unlikely to ever be 
satisfied, because the unobserved unit heterogeneity will almost always be correlated with the 
independent variables. It is therefore often held that unit fixed effects models, which do not 
incorporate this strict assumption, better account for unobserved unit heterogeneity (Green et al. 
2001). A specification including country fixed effects simultaneously counters the possibility of 
cluster confounding (i.e., confounding distinct within- and between-cluster effects into a single 
average effect) because the estimated parameters represent purely within-cluster (longitudinal) effects 
(Kittel 1999; Skrondal and Rabe-Hesketh 2008; Zorn 2001). The second pairs of columns in tables 
A3.a, A3.b, and A3.c give the results of country fixed effects models with panel-corrected standard 
errors. The substantial conclusions remain, though the regions of significance of the marginal effect of 
foreign economic penetration in the models testing the absorptive capacity thesis become somewhat 
smaller. However, this is likely due to the relatively low amount of longitudinal variation of the three 
measures of absorptive capacity. 
Actual Economic Flows. Tables A4.a and A4.b present the estimates for another measure of 
foreign economic penetration: the sub-index Actual Economic Flows from the KOF Index of 
Globalization (Dreher 2006; Dreher et al. 2008). As argued earlier, this measure may not adequately 
reflect the theoretical concept. Nevertheless, the confidence in the results is strengthened by the fact 
that the results remain stable also when using this measure of foreign economic penetration. 
Political Terror Scale (PTS). The CIRI Physical Integrity Rights Index is only one out of two 
prominent measures of repression of the right to physical integrity. Tables A5.a and A5.b present the 
results when we repeat the same exercise for the other prominent measure: the Political Terror Scale 
(Gibney et al. 2006). Ordered probit models with standard errors clustered at the country level were 
estimated to do justice to the ordinal nature of the dependent variable.12 The basic conclusions remain 
                                                     
12 Of course, both the PTS and the CIRI index are ordinal in nature. However, while the CIRI index offers a 9-
point scale, the PTS has only 5 categories. The almost double amount of categories of the former allows the 
usage of estimators designed for continuous data (Beck 2001), whereas the much shorter scale of the PTS 
makes it necessary to choose an estimator that accounts for the ordinal nature of the dependent variable. Note 
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the same. However, the marginal effect of foreign economic penetration over executive constraints is 
never statistically significant. Still, absorptive capacity as measured by economic wealth and literacy 
rate continues to mediate the foreign economic penetration-repression nexus in the way suggested by 
the implications. All in all, the results for the PTS provide further support for the absorptive capacity 
thesis. 
Additional analyses. In addition to what has been discussed so far, several other robustness tests 
were conducted (the results of which are available upon request). First, a 5-year lag of all independent 
variables was employed instead of the 3-year lag. Second, one-year time dummies were used instead 
of the three-year time dummies. Third, data on FDI inward stock was used as measure of foreign 
economic penetration. The basic conclusions remain the same. 
Conclusion 
In spite of numerous empirical inquiries, a consensus on the consequences of the increased flows of 
capital and goods for the protection of security rights has not yet evolved. Most researchers interested 
in this aspect of globalization nevertheless stick to the deterministic arguments of liberals and 
dependistas and continually re-test them. In this article, the argument was made that we should stop 
disputing whether liberals or dependistas are right and should instead consider the contradictory 
empirical evidence as complementary. Neither of the two theories seems to make robust predictions, 
and this clearly points to the need to adjust our theoretical arguments so that they better reflect the 
apparent complexity of the foreign economic penetration-repression nexus.   
In line with this, a new theoretical framework that was presented that combines liberal and neo-
Marxist thought by detailing the context under which each of the traditional views is likely to hold. 
This led to the identification of two very different scenarios. Which one of these plays out depends 
first and foremost on the ability of a country to absorb the potential beneficial spillovers foreign 
economic penetration provides. In the more optimistic case, foreign economic penetration creates jobs 
and thereby ameliorates the economic fate not only of those who are lucky enough to profit from the 
increased employment opportunities, but – because of the increase in national revenue and therefore in 
                                                                                                                                                                      
that in contrast to the CIRI index, higher values in the PTS indicate higher repression levels. A positive sign 
indicates thus more repression, and vice versa. 
27 
 
the resources available for redistributive purposes – also of those who remain (or become) 
unemployed. In this scenario, the ensuing economic development and social equality will contribute to 
lower repression levels. In stark contrast, foreign economic penetration benefits an exclusive, very 
small fraction of citizens only in the pessimistic case while damaging the local economy. Here, the 
elite will increasingly employ repression in order to uphold the political system from which it 
personally profits as well as to suppress the redistributive demands of the increasing share of poor.   
Empirical support for the main implications of the argument was demonstrated. Using the CIRI 
Physical Integrity Rights Index, a composite measure of foreign economic penetration and three 
different proxies for absorptive capacity, strong evidence for the proposition of contextual effects was 
found. That is, the relationship between foreign economic penetration and the repression of the right to 
physical integrity seems indeed conditioned on absorptive capacity. While foreign economic 
penetration is associated with greater state respect for security rights in further developed societies 
with a sound institutional setting and high levels of human capital, it brings about more repression of 
security rights in less developed countries with bad institutions and education levels. Notably, this 
result is not driven by regional differences and robust to the inclusion of country fixed effects. It holds 
furthermore when alternative measures of repression and foreign economic penetration are used. 
Meanwhile, no unconditional, direct effect of foreign economic penetration was found in any model, 
which lends the notion of context-dependence further support. 
These results suggest that the rapidly progressing globalization of the economies puts at stake the 
human freedom of those who are already vastly underprivileged while weakening the basis of 
democracy still further in those places where authoritarian regimes are already the rule rather than the 
exception. However, at the same time, the insight that contextual factors mediate the relationship 
between foreign economic penetration and repression could also provide the answer. Contrary to the 
neo-Marxist view, economic globalization seems not to threaten the rights of the masses in every 
developing country. Context matters. Thus, efforts at ameliorating human capital, infrastructure and 
institutional quality in the least developed countries could pay off not only as such, but also in terms of 
improved human rights records. Of course, these are no short-term solutions. But the creation of 
conditions enabling countries to profit from economic globalization may be the only practicable way 
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to counter its negative implications. The one thing we cannot do is to stop the globalization of trade 
and economies (Sen 1999). But it may be possible to halt the malign dynamics associated with it in the 
least developed countries by designing and investing in policies directed particularly at improvements 
of absorptive capacity. Hence, governments have a crucial role. They have to create and sustain the 
assets necessary so that all can profit from economic globalization. 
However, the main lesson is certainly that future research on the complex relationship between 
multinational investment, trade and repression should not blindly assume uniform effects but think of 
and make explicit the context and conditions under which the propositions hold. In other words, the 
question we pose should not be whether economic globalization is good or bad for human rights, but 
rather under what circumstances it is good or bad for human rights.  
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Appendix 
Table A1: Operationalizations and Data Sources 
Variable Expected Effect Operationalization Source 
    Dependent Variable 
    Repression  CIRI Physical Integrity Rights Index, ranging from 0 (no respect 
for the right to physical integrity) to 8 (full respect for the right to 
physical integrity). 
Cingranelli and  
Richards (2011) 
        Independent Variables 
    Foreign Economic 
Penetration 
+/- Index that aims at capturing the various ways foreign economic 
actors can penetrate an economy, including data on FDI inward 
stock and flows as well as exports of goods and services. 
UNCTAD (2011), 
World Bank (2012) 
    Economic Wealth + 
/Mediator 
Logged GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity (PPP) in 
constant 2005 I$. 
Heston et al. (2011) 
    Literacy Rate Mediator 10y-mean of the adult literacy rate.  World Bank (2012) 
    Executive  
Constraints 
Mediator Assesses the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision-
making powers of chief executives. It ranges from 1 (unlimited 
authority) to 7 (executive parity/subordination). 
Marshall and Jaggers 
(2010). 
    Civil War  
(Low Intensity) 
- Dummy variable coded 1 if a country has experienced 25 to 999 
battle-related deaths in an interstate or an internationalized internal 
armed conflict in a given year, 0 otherwise. 
Gleditsch et al. (2002); 
Themnér and 
Wallensteen (2011) 
    Civil War  
(High Intensity) 
- Dummy variable coded 1 if a country has experienced at least 
1,000 battle-related deaths in an interstate or an internationalized 
internal armed conflict in a given year, 0 otherwise. 
Gleditsch et al. (2002); 
Themnér and 
Wallensteen (2011) 
    International War - Dummy variable coded 1 if a country has experienced at least 
1,000 battle-related deaths in an interstate armed conflict in a 
given year, 0 otherwise.  
Gleditsch et al. (2002); 
Themnér and 
Wallensteen (2011) 
    Economic Growth +/- GDP growth in annual percent. World Bank (2012) 
    Population Size - Logged total population.  World Bank (2012) 
    Population Growth - Population growth in annual percent. World Bank (2012) 
    Democracy + Variant I: the combined Polity IV score that measures the degree 
of institutionalized democracy and autocracy. It ranges from -10 
(full autocracy) to 10 (full democracy). 
Variant II: the democratic regime dummy presented in Alvarez et 
al. (1996). 
Marshall and Jaggers 
(2010) 
 
 
Cheibub et al. (2010) 
    Military Regime - Dummy variable coded 1 if the regime is a military dictatorship, 0 
otherwise. 
Cheibub et al. (2010) 
    Communist 
Regime 
- Dummy variable coded 1 if the ruler is the communist party 
leader, 0 otherwise. 
Cheibub et al. (2010) 
    Fuels Exporter - Dummy variable coded 1 if a country is a major fuels exporter, 
i.e., if fuels exports account for more than 50% of total exports of 
goods and services, 0 otherwise. 
Easterly and Sewadeh 
(2001) 
    Colonial 
Experience 
+/- Three dummy variables coded 1 if a country is a former British, 
French, or Iberian colony, 0 otherwise. A country is considered a 
former colony if it was colonized for a relatively long period of 
time and if there was a substantial participation in the governance 
of the colonized country.  
Mayer and Zignago 
(2011) 
    Social 
Globalization 
+ The KOF Index of Social Globalization measures the level of 
social globalization along three categories: (1) personal contacts 
capture the direct interaction among people living in different 
countries, (2) information flows measure the potential flow of 
ideas and images, and (3) cultural proximity assesses the influence 
of external culture. It ranges from .1 (lowest) to 10 (highest). 
Dreher (2006); Dreher et 
al. (2008) 
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Past Practice + CIRI Physical Integrity Rights Index (lagged), ranging from 0 (no 
respect for the right to physical integrity) to 8 (full respect for the 
right to physical integrity). 
Cingranelli and  
Richards (2011) 
        Sensitivity Analyses 
    Economic Flows 
(KOF) 
+/- The KOF Sub-Index Actual Economic Flows measures the degree 
to which a country is exposed to foreign capital and trade. The 
Index ranges from 1 to 100. 
Dreher (2006; Dreher et 
al. (2008) 
    Political Terror 
Scale (PTS) 
 The PTS measures levels of state-sanctioned political violence on 
a 5-category ordinal scale. 
Gibney et al. (2006) 
     
 
Table A2: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
      Phys. Int. Rights Index (CIRI) 2,510 4.137 2.039 0 8 
Foreign Economic Penetration 2,510 4.931 1.687 .893 9.935 
GDP p. Capita (PPP, log) 2,510 7.758 .96 5.067 9.895 
Literacy Rate (10y-mean) 1,682 71.101 23.317 10.895 99.814 
Executive Constraints 2,449 3.991 2.11 1 7 
Social Globalization 2,510 30.548 13.64 6.33 75.65 
Democracy (Polity IV) 2,510 .637 6.64 -10 10 
Democracy (ACLP) 2,449 .399 .49 0 1 
Population Size (log) 2,510 9.262 1.507 6.082 14.086 
Population Growth 2,510 1.95 1.258 -7.533 11.18 
Economic Growth 2,510 3.691 6.056 -50.248 106.28 
Civil War (Low Intensity) 2,510 .142 .3494 0 1 
Civil War (High Intensity) 2,510 .065 .246 0 1 
International War 2,510 .027 .161 0 1 
Military Regime 2,510 .24 .427 0 1 
Communist Regime 2,510 .044 .204 0 1 
Fuels Exporter 2,510 .079 .27 0 1 
British Colony 2,510 .281 .45 0 1 
French Colony 2,510 .247 .431 0 1 
Iberian Colony 2,510 .23 .421 0 1 
Past Practice 2,510 4.211 2.098 0 8 
Economic Flows (KOF) 2,514 49.843 19.629 4.63 98.72 
Political Terror Scale (PTS) 2,921 2.839 1.029 1 5 
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Table A3.a: RI and FE Models of CIRI Physical Integrity Rights Index, 1984-2010 
 
 
Note: the βs are unstandardized coefficients; * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 (two-tailed test); all independent variables 
are lagged by 3 years; all models contain 3-year time dummies (not reported); models 7 and 8 are random intercept models 
and are estimated by maximum likelihood; models 9 and 10 contain country fixed effects (not reported) and are estimated by 
OLS with panel-corrected standard errors (PCSEs).   
 Model 7 w/o SSA 
Model 8 
 w/o SSA 
Model 9 
Fixed Effects 
Model 10 
Fixed Effects 
Variables β S.E. β S.E. β S.E. β S.E. 
         
Foreign Economic Penetration .016*** .035 -1.015*** .281 -.03*** .027 -.795*** .202 
Economic Wealth (log) -.113*** .122 -.693*** .198 -.337*** .196 -.83**** .212 
Foreign Economic Penetration X 
Economic Wealth (log)   .128*** .034   .099*** .025 
Social Globalization .005*** .006 .002*** .007 -.002*** .008 -.01**** .008 
Democracy (Polity IV) .029*** .01 .03**** .01 .019*** .01 .022*** .01 
Population Size (log) -.448*** .043 -.468*** .043 -1.218*** .356 -.845*** .393 
Population Growth -.04**** .053 -.051*** .053 .132*** .047 .139*** .048 
Economic Growth -.012*** .006 -.012*** .006 -.008*** .005 -.008*** .005 
Civil War (Low Intensity) -.44**** .115 -.468*** .115 -.396*** .108 -.422*** .108 
Civil War (High Intensity) -1.156*** .171 -1.173*** .17 -1.074*** .172 -1.128*** .174 
International War .162*** .198 .089*** .2 -.012*** .185 -.019*** .181 
Military Regime -.199*** .14 -.174*** .14 -.217*** .122 -.198*** .12 
Communist Regime .295*** .25 .406*** .25 -.019*** .418 .11**** .412 
Fuels Exporter -.368*** .269 -.315*** .268     
British Colony -.077*** .192 -.079*** .191     
French Colony .107*** .212 .151*** .211     
Iberian Colony -.057*** .174 -.008*** .174     
Past Practice (Yt-3) .343*** .024 .335*** .024 .259*** .046 .255*** .045 
Intercept 8.063*** .992 13.025***  16.849*** 3.78 17.96*** 3.69 
         
Random Effects Std. Dev. S.E. Std. Dev. S.E. Std. Dev. S.E. Std. Dev. S.E. 
         
Level-1 (Time) 1.173*** .022 1.168*** .022     
Level-2 (Country) .432*** .06 .43**** .06     
         
Model Properties         
         
N (Level-1) 1506  1506  2510  2510  
N (Level-2) 71  71  114  114  
Deviance 4848.737  4835.094      
AIC 4904.737  4893.093      
BIC 5053.619  5047.292      
R2     .645  .647  
LR Test vs. Additive Model (chi2)   13.64***      
        
37 
 
Table A3.b: RI and FE Models of CIRI Physical Integrity Rights Index, 1984-2010 
 
 
Note: the βs are unstandardized coefficients; * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 (two-tailed test); all independent variables 
are lagged by 3 years; all models contain 3-year time dummies (not reported); models 11 and 12 are random intercept 
models and are estimated by maximum likelihood; models 13 and 14 contain country fixed effects (not reported) and are 
estimated by OLS with panel-corrected standard errors (PCSEs). 
  
 Model 11 w/o SSA 
Model 12 
 w/o SSA 
Model 13 
Fixed Effects 
Model 14 
Fixed Effects 
Variables β S.E. β S.E. β S.E. β S.E. 
         
Foreign Economic Penetration .032*** .044 -.348*** .136 -.048*** .04 -.358*** .095 
Literacy Rate -.012*** .006 -.029*** .008 -.018*** .01 -.029*** .01 
Foreign Economic Penetration X 
Literacy Rate   .005*** .002   .004*** .001 
Economic Wealth (log) -.165*** .155 -.17**** .158 -.44**** .262 -.414*** .256 
Social Globalization .009*** .008 .008*** .008 .004*** .009 .002*** .009 
Democracy (Polity IV) .029*** .012 .028*** .012 .018*** .012 .021*** .012 
Population Size (log) -.538*** .06 -.551*** .062 -.51**** .537 -.082*** .56 
Population Growth -.241*** .089 -.223*** .09 .137*** .046 .161*** .047 
Economic Growth -.019*** .008 -.022*** .008 -.017*** .007 -.017*** .007 
Civil War (Low Intensity) -.237*** .126 -.242*** .125 -.168*** .119 -.205*** .119 
Civil War (High Intensity) -.928*** .201 -.898*** .201 -.809*** .185 -.856*** .186 
International War .175*** .2 .163*** .199 .001*** .18 .038*** .175 
Military Regime -.32**** .169 -.334*** .171 -.269*** .147 -.249*** .144 
Communist Regime .547*** .362 .566*** .377     
Fuels Exporter -.255*** .36 -.249*** .375     
British Colony -.152*** .278 -.032*** .291     
French Colony .082*** .274 .242*** .291     
Iberian Colony .147*** .218 .247*** .228     
Past Practice (Yt-3) .288*** .029 .275*** .028 .225*** .051 .221*** .05 
Intercept 10.93*** 1.35 12.422*** 1.44 14.591*** 4.56 11.78*** 4.72 
         
Random Effects Std. Dev. S.E. Std. Dev. S.E. Std. Dev. S.E. Std. Dev. S.E. 
         
Level-1 (Time) 1.122*** .025 1.115*** .025     
Level-2 (Country) .536*** .075 .567*** .077     
         
Model Properties         
         
N (Level-1) 1099  1099  1682  1682  
N (Level-2) 65  65  107  107  
Deviance 3469.992  3461.543      
AIC 3527.992  3521.543      
BIC 3673.055  3671.609      
R2     .693  .695  
LR Test vs. Additive Model (chi2)   8.45***      
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Table A3.c: RI and FE Models of CIRI Physical Integrity Rights Index, 1984-2010 
 
 
Note: the βs are unstandardized coefficients; * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 (two-tailed test); all independent variables 
are lagged by 3 years; all models contain 3-year time dummies (not reported); models 15 and 16 are random intercept 
models and are estimated by maximum likelihood; models 17 and 18 contain country fixed effects (not reported) and are 
estimated by OLS with panel-corrected standard errors (PCSEs). 
 Model 15 w/o SSA 
Model 16 
 w/o SSA 
Model 17 
Fixed Effects 
Model 18 
Fixed Effects 
Variables β S.E. β S.E. β S.E. β S.E. 
         
Foreign Economic Penetration .035*** .036 -.205*** .06 -.024*** .029 -.135*** .046 
Executive Constraints .062*** .033 -.211*** .064 .068*** .031 -.079*** .062 
Foreign Economic Penetration X 
Executive Constraints   .058*** .012   .031*** .01 
Economic Wealth (log) -.116*** .121 -.113*** .123 -.398*** .213 -.352*** .21 
Social Globalization .006*** .006 .002*** .007 .001*** .008 -.002*** .008 
Democracy (ACLP) .2***** .147 .186*** .147 .045*** .148 .089*** .15 
Population Size (log) -.447*** .043 -.427*** .045 -1.038*** .355 -.686*** .377 
Population Growth -.039*** .053 -.053*** .053 .145*** .047 .148*** .047 
Economic Growth -.013*** .006 -.013*** .006 -.008*** .005 -.008*** .005 
Civil War (Low Intensity) -.452*** .116 -.476*** .116 -.386*** .107 -.389*** .107 
Civil War (High Intensity) -1.091*** .173 -1.133*** .173 -1.034*** .169 -1.053*** .169 
International War .148*** .198 .083*** .198 -.018*** .183 -.022*** .181 
Military Regime -.133*** .143 -.178*** .144 -.137*** .125 -.127*** .124 
Communist Regime .285*** .242 .166*** .25 -.031*** .434 -.07**** .428 
Fuels Exporter -.346*** .265 -.312*** .275     
British Colony -.069*** .188 -.043*** .195     
French Colony .105*** .209 .151*** .217     
Iberian Colony -.053*** .209 -.075*** .177     
Past Practice (Yt-3) .338*** .024 .321*** .024 .257*** .046 .252*** .046 
Intercept 7.724*** .972 8.84*** 1.01 15.61*** 3.79 13.12*** 3.87 
         
Random Effects Std. Dev. S.E. Std. Dev. S.E. Std. Dev. S.E. Std. Dev. S.E. 
         
Level-1 (Time) 1.172*** .022 1.159*** .022     
Level-2 (Country) .42**** .059 .448*** .061     
         
Model Properties         
         
N (Level-1) 1491  1491  2449  2449  
N (Level-2) 71  71  114  114  
Deviance 4794.226  4769.923      
AIC 4852.226  4829.923      
BIC 5006.135  4989.139      
R2     .644  .646  
LR Test vs. Additive Model (chi2)   24.3***      
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Figure A1: Marginal Effect of FEP over Econ. Wealth (Model 8) Figure A3: Marginal Effect of FEP over Literacy Rate (Model 12) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A2: Marginal Effect of FEP over Econ. Wealth (Model 10) Figure A4:  Marginal Effect of FEP over Literacy Rate (Model 14)  
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Note: in figures 5-8, the solid lines give the marginal effect. In figures 5 
and 7, the dashed lines give the 95% confidence interval. In figures 6 and 
8, the dashed lines give the 90% confidence interval. 
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Figure A5: Marginal Effect of FEP over Executive Constraints (Model 16) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure A6: Marginal Effect of FEP over Executive Constraints (Model 18) 
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Note: in figures 9 and 10, the solid lines give the marginal effect. In figure 
9, the dashed lines give the 95% confidence interval. In figure 10, the 
dashed lines give the 90% confidence interval. 
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Table A4.a: Random Intercept Models of CIRI Physical Integrity Rights Index, 1984-2010 
 
 
Note: the βs are unstandardized coefficients; * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 (two-tailed test); all independent variables 
are lagged by 3 years; all models contain 3-year time dummies (not reported) and are estimated by maximum likelihood. 
 
 
 
 Model 19 Econ. Wealth 
Model 20 
Econ. Wealth 
Model 21 
Literacy 
Model 22 
Literacy 
Variables β S.E. β S.E. β S.E. β S.E. 
         
Economic Flows (KOF) -.001*** .003 -.069*** .016 -.001*** .003 -.024*** .008 
Economic Wealth (log) .022*** .08 -.397*** .125 .099*** .102 .087*** .103 
Economic Flows (KOF) X 
Economic Wealth (log)   .009*** .002     
Literacy     -.003*** .004 -.015*** .006 
Economic Flows (KOF) X 
Literacy       <.001*** <.01 
Social Globalization .007*** .005 .003*** .006 .006*** .007 .004*** .007 
Democracy (Polity IV) .032*** .008 .033*** .008 .03**** .01 .03**** .01 
Population Size (log) -.459*** .039 -.46**** .038 -.515*** .05 -.524*** .05 
Population Growth .045*** .033 .038*** .032 .054*** .039 .071*** .04 
Economic Growth -.008*** .005 -.009** .005 -.014*** .01 -.016*** .006 
Civil War (Low Intensity) -.46*** .098 -.483*** .1 -.264*** .108 -.271*** .108 
Civil War (High Intensity) -1.1*** .139 -1.148*** .138 -.906*** .161 -.906*** .161 
International War -.015*** .183 -.031*** .183 .01*** .191 -0.000*** .191 
Military Regime -.187*** .101 -.222*** .101 -.337*** .133 -.318*** .133 
Communist Regime .273*** .247 .355*** .245 .828*** .41 .789*** .413 
Fuels Exporter -.341*** .212 -.317*** .209 -.389*** .277 -.354*** .279 
British Colony -.042*** .156 -.034*** .154 -.115*** .194 -.028*** .197 
French Colony .088*** .165 .103*** .163 .134*** .214 .245*** .218 
Iberian Colony -.111*** .164 -.096*** .162 -.025*** .194 -.004*** .196 
Past Practice (Yt-3) .313*** .019 .308*** .019 .284*** .023 .28**** .023 
Intercept 7.169*** .657 10.443*** .994 7.457*** .83 8.416*** .886 
         
Random Effects Std. Dev. S.E. Std. Dev. S.E. Std. Dev. S.E. Std. Dev. S.E. 
         
Level-1 (Time) 1.265*** .018 1.261*** .018 1.163*** .021 1.159*** .021 
Level-2 (Country) .474**** .048 .466*** .048 .565*** .059 .57**** .059 
         
Model Properties         
         
N (Level-1) 2514  2514  1677  1677  
N (Level-2) 111  111  104  104  
Deviance 8471.321  8452.3  5422.556  5412.751  
AIC 8527.321  8510.3  5480.556  5472.751  
BIC 8690.551  8679.359  5637.874  5635.494  
LR Test vs. Additive Model (chi2)   19.02***    9.81***  
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Table A4.b: Random Intercept Models of CIRI Physical Integrity Rights Index, 1984-2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: the βs are unstandardized coefficients; * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 (two-tailed test); all independent variables 
are lagged by 3 years; all models contain 3-year time dummies (not reported) and are estimated by maximum likelihood. 
 Model 23 Ex. Constraints 
Model 24 
Ex. Constraints 
Variables β S.E. β S.E. 
     
Economic Flows (KOF) <.001*** .003 -.01**** .004 
Executive Constraints .076*** .027 -.059*** .049 
Economic Flows (KOF) X 
Executive Constraints   .003*** .001 
Economic Wealth (log) -.018*** .081 -.016*** .081 
Social Globalization .009*** .006 .008*** .006 
Democracy (ACLP) .181*** .118 .215*** .118 
Population Size (log) -.456*** .039 -.451*** .039 
Population Growth .058*** .038 .058*** .033 
Economic Growth -.008*** .005 -.008*** .005 
Civil War (Low Intensity) -.461*** .1 -.478*** .1 
Civil War (High Intensity) 1.078*** .142 -1.106*** .142 
International War -.013*** .184 -.016*** .183 
Military Regime -.128*** .107 -.139*** .107 
Communist Regime .194*** .247 .17**** .247 
Fuels Exporter -.272*** .213 -.208*** .214 
British Colony -.079*** .157 -.065*** .157 
French Colony .072*** .167 .102*** .167 
Iberian Colony -.106*** .166 -.114*** .165 
Past Practice (Yt-3) .309*** .02 .305*** .02 
Intercept 6.991*** .657 7.455*** .671 
     
Random Effects Std. Dev. S.E. Std. Dev. S.E. 
     
Level-1 (Time) 1.26**** .019 1.257*** .018 
Level-2 (Country) .476**** .048 .475*** .048 
     
Model Properties     
     
N (Level-1) 2455  2455  
N (Level-2) 111  111  
Deviance 8254.396  8242.447  
AIC 8312.396  8303.447  
BIC 8480.766  8477.624  
LR Test vs. Additive Model (chi2)   10.95***  
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Figure A7: Marginal Effect of FEP over Econ. Wealth (Model 20) Figure A9: Marginal Effect of FEP over Exec. Constraints (Model 24) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A8: Marginal Effect of FEP Literacy Rate (Model 22)   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: in figures 11-13, the solid lines give the marginal effect and the 
dashed lines the 95% confidence interval.  
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Table A5.a: Ordered Probit Models of Political Terror Scale (PTS), 1979-2010 
 
 
Note: the βs are unstandardized coefficients; the S.E.s are robust standard errors, clustered at the country-level; * p < .10, 
** p < .05, *** p < .01 (two-tailed test); all independent variables are lagged by 3 yeasr; all models contain 3-year time 
dummies (not reported) and are estimated by maximum likelihood.  
 Model 25 Econ. Wealth 
Model 26 
Econ. Wealth 
Model 27 
Literacy 
Model 28 
Literacy 
Variables β S.E. β S.E. β S.E. β S.E. 
         
Foreign Economic Penetration -.002*** .024 .529*** .156 .003*** .025 .169*** .062 
Economic Wealth (log) .053*** .065 .337*** .107 .005*** .071 -.01**** .069 
Foreign Economic Penetration X 
Economic Wealth (log)   -.07*** .02     
Literacy     .002*** .003 .012 .005 
Foreign Economic Penetration X 
Literacy       -.002*** .001 
Social Globalization -.01**** .004 -.006*** .004 -.011*** .005 -.009*** .005 
Democracy (Polity IV) -.016*** .007 -.016*** .007 -.007*** .008 -.006*** .008 
Population Size (log) .227*** .024 .233*** .025 .221*** .035 .227*** .035 
Population Growth -.001*** .04 -.002*** .039 -.003*** .064 -.02**** .062 
Economic Growth .001*** .006 .002*** .005 .003*** .01 .004*** .009 
Civil War (Low Intensity) .464*** .108 .482*** .106 .315*** .107 .316*** .105 
Civil War (High Intensity) .727*** .126 .782*** .129 .742*** .145 .768*** .15 
International War -.188*** .166 -.177*** .165 -.17**** .185 -.158*** .19 
Military Regime .204*** .079 .245*** .08 .288*** .094 .287*** .095 
Communist Regime -.385*** .155 -.449*** .147 -.425*** .207 -.443*** .179 
Fuels Exporter .076*** .109 .064*** .115 .211*** .15 .205*** .153 
British Colony -.015*** .109 -.051*** .11 .018*** .137 -.034*** .138 
French Colony -.118*** .106 -.168*** .11 -.21**** .136 -.275*** .138 
Iberian Colony .077*** .117 .046*** .115 -.079*** .131 -.118*** .137 
Past Practice (Yt-3) .612*** .043 .595*** .043 .661*** .052 .647*** .053 
         
Thresholds β S.E. β S.E. β S.E. β S.E. 
         
Cut 1 2.057*** .503 4.3***** .883 1.711*** .62 2.229*** .662 
Cut 2 3.67**** .492 5.924*** .878 3.3***** .611 3.824*** .658 
Cut 3 5.07**** .516 7.33**** .901 4.781*** .637 5.314*** .684 
Cut 4 6.388*** .538 8.652*** .915 6.214*** .663 6.751*** .707 
         
Model Properties         
         
N (Level-1) 2921  2921  1801  1801  
N (Level-2) 114  114  108  108  
Deviance 6338.161  6314.594  3833.246  3821.413  
AIC 6400.161  6378.594  3893.246  3883.413  
BIC 6585.531  6569.944  4058.129  4053.792  
LR Test vs. Additive Model (chi2)   23.57***    11.83***  
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Table A5.b: Ordered Probit Models of Political Terror Scale (PTS), 1979-2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: the βs are unstandardized coefficients; the S.E.s are robust standard errors, clustered at the country-level; * p < .10, 
** p < .05, *** p < .01 (two-tailed test); all independent variables are lagged by 3 years; all models contain 3-year time 
dummies (not reported) and are estimated by maximum likelihood. 
 Model 29 Ex. Constraints 
Model 30 
Ex. Constraints 
Variables β S.E. β S.E. 
     
Foreign Economic Penetration -.01**** .025 .06**** .041 
Executive Constraints -.048*** .028 .054*** .064 
Foreign Economic Penetration X 
Executive Constraints   -.021*** .011 
Economic Wealth (log) .078*** .065 .075*** .064 
Social Globalization -.011*** .005 -.01**** .005 
Democracy (ACLP) -.034*** .117 -.044*** .117 
Population Size (log) .222*** .024 .215*** .025 
Population Growth -.015*** .038 -.015*** .038 
Economic Growth .003*** .005 .003*** .005 
Civil War (Low Intensity) .453*** .116 .454*** .108 
Civil War (High Intensity) .742*** .116 .744*** .117 
International War -.168*** .164 -.185*** .17 
Military Regime .182*** .078 .212*** .08 
Communist Regime -.361*** .142 -.328** .153 
Fuels Exporter .027*** .109 .004*** .109 
British Colony .055*** .101 .04**** .102 
French Colony -.072*** .097 -.102*** .099 
Iberian Colony .108*** .112 .11**** .111 
Past Practice (Yt-3) .613*** .043 .608*** .042 
     
Thresholds β S.E. β S.E. 
     
Cut 1 2.004*** .491 2.255*** .506 
Cut 2 3.608*** .482 3.864*** .498 
Cut 3 5.034*** .507 5.293*** .524 
Cut 4 6.374*** .528 6.635*** .545 
     
Model Properties     
     
N (Level-1) 2818  2818  
N (Level-2) 114  1147  
Deviance 6077.955  6067.032  
AIC 6137.955  6129.032  
BIC 6316.268  6313.29  
LR Test vs. Additive Model (chi2)   10.92***  
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Figure A10: Marginal Effect of FEP over Econ. Wealth (Model 28) Figure A12: Marginal Effect of FEP over Exec. Constraints (Model 32) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A11: Marginal Effect of FEP Literacy Rate (Model 30)   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: in figures 14-16, the solid lines give the marginal effect and the 
dashed lines the 95% confidence interval.  
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